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The Defence of Cosmopolitan Capitalism by Sir Charles Addis, 1914-1919: A 
Microhistorical Study of a Classical Liberal Banker in Wartime 
 
Abstract: This study focuses on the efforts of Sir Charles Addis, a London merchant 
banker, to preserve and then restore the pre-1914 system of cosmopolitan capitalism. Our 
central research question is to understand why this business leader fought to preserve 
cosmopolitan capitalism when so many of his peers acquiesced to and even championed its 
demise.  Addis’s moral ideal was an international economic order in which the nationality of 
firms had a limited impact on the strategies of managers. The First World War profoundly 
changed the international business environment and dramatically increased the salience of 
firm nationality in international business. Addis, who was a committed classical liberal, 
fought against this trend to a degree that is hard to explain with reference to economic self-
interest alone. The paper, which is based on a range of sources including Addis’s diary, 
explores Addis’s connections to, and views of, ‘German’ bankers, his relations with the 
British government, and the political economy of the reparations imposed on Germany by the 
Versailles Peace settlement.    
 




Writing during the pre-2008 heyday of neoliberal globalization, the business historian 
Geoffrey Jones (2005, 18) noted that while many nineteenth-century firms were of 
ambiguous nationality, the First World War ended this era of  “cosmopolitan capitalism” and 
ushered in an era in which a firm’s nationality was far more important. Jones made this point 
in the course of addressing turn of the twenty-first century debates (e.g., Reich, 1990; 
Chandler and Mazlish, 2005) about globalization and the rise of the multinational firms that 
seemed to have no nationality whatsoever. In the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the 2008 financial crisis, various “hyperglobalist” authors (Ohmae, 1990; Friedman, 
2005) asserted that emergence of a borderless world economy dominated by post-national 
firms was both irreversible and historically unprecedented (Dicken, 2007). Jones challenged 
this view by reminding us that the firm of ambiguous nationality is a phenomenon with 
historical precedents in the period immediately before the First World War. These precedents 
included the many Free-Standing Companies (da Silva Lopes et al., 2018) and other firms 




Jones was drawing on his knowledge of previous cycles of globalization and 
deglobalization to suggest that it would be foolish to assume that the nationality of firms will 
inevitably decrease in salience. Events since the 2008 financial crisis include evidence of 
deglobalization and the increasing importance of firm nationality (Tooze, 2018; Munjal, 
Budhwar, and Pereira, 2018). Today, whether the nationality that observers associate with 
firms (e.g., whether a given company is viewed as “Chinese” or “American”) is more 
important than it was in the years immediately before 2008. While “liability of foreignness” 
is hardly a new phenomenon in international business (Lubinski, 2014), the recently political 
backlash against globalization has certainly increased the “liability of foreignness” faced by 
many firms (Witt, 2019).  In retrospect, Jones (2005) seems to have been right to challenge 
the hyperglobalist narrative that held that the rootless, post-national multinational firm 
represented the wave of the future. At a time when rising geopolitical tensions and the 
populist backlash against globalization appear to be making firm nationality and national 
borders more, rather than less important, in international business (Munjal, Budhwar, and 
Pereira, 2018), it is helpful to examine how business leaders of the past responded when 
cosmopolitan capitalism was under attack.     
This paper is about the efforts of Sir Charles Addis, a London merchant banker to 
preserve and then restore the pre-1914 system of cosmopolitan capitalism.. Addis was the 
effective head of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) from 1911 to 
1921. In this paper, the term cosmopolitan capitalism denotes a set of formal economic and 
political institutions in which the nationality of a firm has limited impact on the strategies of 
its managers and business partners. Beginning with Schumpeter (1919/1951), who 
distinguished nationalist capitalism from liberal capitalism, political economists interested in 
warfare have recognised that the broad term capitalism includes radically different sets of 
socio-economic institutions (Coyne and Mathers, 2011). As Rosencrance (1986) observed, 
capitalism comes in a wide variety of variants, some more compatible with economic 
nationalism and militarism than others: the ideal-type of cosmopolitan capitalism can be 
regarded as the polar opposite of nationalist (or mercantilist) capitalism. In cosmopolitan 
capitalism, the nationality of firms and the location of national borders are of little 
consequence. In a world of intensive economic nationalism, they become central facts in 
business life. The First World War profoundly changed the international business 
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environment: “cosmopolitan capitalism was replaced by much sharper national identities” 
(Jones, 2005, 29).   
Historians have published extensively about the impact of the First World War on the 
strategies and structures of multinational firms (Kindleberger, 1986; Wilkins, 2005, 46-47; 
Frieden, 2006; Osterhammel and Petersson, 2005; Frieden, 2006; McKeown, 2007; Tooze 
and Fertik, 2014; Wubs et al, 2018). Economic historians have generally regarded the 
outbreak of the war as the start of a period of deglobalization (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007, 
429) in which borders and a firm’s nationality rapidly became more important. The business 
historian Robert Fitzgerald (2016, 157) stresses that the outbreak of the First World War 
disrupted multinational business, “reversing decades long growth.” Other business historians 
have documented how specific firms adjusted their strategies in response to the changes 
brought about by First World War (for reviews of literature see Smith, Tennent, and Mollan, 
2016; Wubs et al., 2018).  
The existing historiography has said far less about business leaders who worked to 
preserve and then restore pre-1914 cosmopolitan capitalism. Business leaders did more than 
passively adjust firm strategies in response to the changes in their environment wrought by 
political and military leaders: Sir Charles Addis and other businessmen lobbied for the 
preservation of cosmopolitan capitalism. Such liberal-minded business leaders fought to 
return to a world in which the nationality of firms and potential business partners was 
unimportant in international business. 
Addis defended cosmopolitan capitalism during and after the First World War. In 
wartime, he argued that his and other “British” firms should continue to be able to do 
business with “German” firms. As the conflict drew to a close, he advocated a swift 
restoration of the pre-war status quo, which would have allowed Germany and “German” 
firms to resume their existing place in the international economy. As was John Maynard 
Keynes, Addis was thus opposed the imposition of harsh reparations on Germany.  In 
articulating these views, he came into conflict with British business leaders who were strong 
economic nationalists and who wanted the British state to destroy “German” firms and the 
German economy more generally so that they would face less formidable competition in 
global markets.  
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In his study of nineteenth-century cosmopolitan capitalism, the historian Charles 
Jones defined economic liberalism as “a profound faith in the collective virtue of aggregated 
individual self-interest and the moral validity of market sanctions” (C. Jones, 1987, 28).  For 
committed classical liberals such as Sir Charles Addis, the fact a given individual or firm 
happened to be associated with a particular nation-state should not matter. This perspective 
was congruent with the classical liberal ideology, which held that free markets, reduced 
taxation, and global commerce would help to ensure world peace (C. Jones, 1987). Classical 
liberals took the principle of methodological individualism seriously and some argued that in 
the event of a conflict between two governments, it would be unjust for the war to affect trade 
between merchants who just happened to be citizens of the two warring states (Searle, 1998, 
206-9). At a time when so many in Britain turned away from classical liberalism and towards 
collectivist doctrines such as socialism and economic nationalism, Addis remained loyal to 
the Victorian ideal of cosmopolitan capitalism and nineteenth-century classical liberalism.  
Some readers may be inclined to attribute Addis’s support for cosmopolitan 
capitalism to the fact that he had made his career in finance. Finance was, as historians have 
shown, a sector of the British economy in which extensive cross-border entanglements were 
the norm (Mollan and Michie, 2012) and in which cosmopolitan worldviews were 
widespread (Marrison, 1983, 164). Addis had few ties to manufacturing, a sector that 
contained many of Britain’s most protectionist and anti-German business leaders (Cain, 
1979). Several historians who have examined the early twentieth century British debates 
about the rise of German industry have posited a close relationship between the source of a 
businessman’s income and whether or not he adopted the zero-sum view that Germany’s 
prosperity necessarily meant that Britain would be worse off (Semmel, 1960, 100; Rempel, 
1972, 97, Sykes, 1979). These historians appear to operate on the assumption that a 
businessman’s political positions will always be determined by his business interests. 
Religion, childhood influences, inborn personality traits, and other factors that might 
influence one’s political positions are discounted by this relentlessly materialistic theory of 
political behaviour. For such scholars, the industry you are in determines your political views. 
These historians have adopted the belief  (Ingham, 2016) that when British businessmen 
disagree over policy issues, the cleavage is consistently  between the City (finance) on the 
one hand and industry (manufacturing) on the other. 
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Building on this scholarly tradition of emphasising antagonism between industry and 
City, Cain and Hopkins (2001, 452)  argued that wartime debate over whether the British 
state should destroy the German economy and “German” firms with a punitive peace was 
marked by tension between manufacturing firms and the financial sector. In their analysis, the 
manufacturers favoured such a policy in the hopes it would benefit British manufacturing 
while the financiers of the City supported a more liberal policy towards Germany as being 
consistent with the needs of the City as a global financial hub. Cain and Hopkins associate 
the fact the British government sought to impose heavy reparations on Germany at Versailles 
to the influence within the wartime coalition of “industrial elite”, whose power had increased 
during the war at the expense of the financial elite of the City, which favoured classical 
liberal policies. They argue that the period in which the industrial elite shaped policy was 
short-lived and that “by 1921” the financial elite “were in charge again and their implicit 
internationalist assumptions guided British economic policy.”   
 Cain and Hopkins’s account of business lobbying and the making of the Versailles 
peace settlement stresses the political division between British industry and British finance. 
Their perspective would imply that Addis’s political positions were determined by the fact he 
was a banker rather than a manufacturer. However, as we show below, Addis’s fight for 
cosmopolitan capitalism pitted him against Lord Cunliffe, a London investment banker who 
had been converted by the war into a militant economic nationalist and advocate of massive 
reparations on Germany. Moreover, in fighting for the restoration of the pre-1914 liberal 
order, Addis cooperated with businessmen in the manufacturing sector who shared Addis’s 
liberal views.   
 In explaining why Addis courted unpopularity by publicly defending cosmopolitan 
capitalism, we need to do more than note that he was a financier rather than a factory owner.  
Instead, we should form a more complete picture of Addis that takes into account his 
intellectual formation and his religious commitments, and even what we know about his 
personality traits. The abundance of surviving documents created by Addis, which include his 
diary, permit us to write a microhistorical study.  
The definitions and boundaries of “microhistory” are contested, particularly as this 
genre of historical research has evolved and has split into different sub-fields since it was 
pioneered by Carlo Ginzburg and other Italian scholars (Magnússon, 2017).  In essence, 
microhistorical studies involve thick description to uncover how individuals understood their 
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worlds. Today, microhistorians are increasingly interested in connecting studies of 
individuals to macro phenomena such as the history of globalization (Gamsa, 2017; Berg, 
2018).   Within the field of business history, microhistory is often associated with the 
pathbreaking work of Carnevali (2011), whose approach was informed by both the work of 
Ginzburg and the work by US-based business historians interested in culture (Lipartito, 2013, 
701). As the microhistorian Jeremy Adelman has noted, the recent populist backlash against 
globalization has influenced scholars’ research priorities, with increasing attention being paid 
to the foundations of cosmopolitan capitalism  (Adelman, 2018). The great advantage of 
microhistorical research methods is that they permit the researcher to explore how material 
(economic self-interest) and non-material consideration (e.g. the political and religious 
beliefs) influence how actors respond when the institutions that support cosmopolitan 
capitalism come under attack, thereby avoiding the use of simplistic theories of human 
behaviour. One such simplistic theory is the idea that a businessperson’s political stance will 
be exclusively determined by their economic self-interest.   
In the aftermath of the political events of 2016, which suggest that liberal principles 
are in retreat, microhistorians have become increasing interested in researching the history of 
“cosmopolitan values such as travel, trade, and tolerance” (Brycroft, 2018). Studying Addis 
allows us to explore the history of these values. Addis’s thoughts are recorded in documents 
that were preserved in HSBC’s internal archive, and London’s School of Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS), which now holds Addis’s personal correspondence and diary. The other 
primary sources important to this project were documents generated by the government 
departments with which Addis interacted, which are in the National Archives in Kew, and 
printed sources such as newspapers and magazines. The authors used these sources to 
reconstruct Addis’s worldview and to develop a well-rounded picture of him as a political 
actor that incorporates material, religious, ideological, and other influences on his thinking. In 
reading this material, our aim was to reconstruct Addis’s worldview and ideology and try to 
see the world as he did.  By doing so, we deepen our understanding of how classical 
liberalism influenced how an important business leader understood geopolitical changes that 




Addis’s Pre-War Banking Career  
 
Charles Stewart Addis was born in Edinburgh in 1861. His father was a minister of 
the Free Church of Scotland, a Presbyterian denomination that had been founded in 1843 
under the leadership of Thomas Chalmers, a minister whose extensive and influential 
writings on political economy were informed by a strong variant of the ideology of laissez-
faire (Emmett, 2014; Kennedy, 2014). The economic theology taught in the Free Church of 
Scotland during Addis’s youth implied that market forces were divinely ordained and that it 
would be immoral for the state to intervene through “unnatural, man-made” (Hilton, 1991, 
68) measures, especially protective tariffs that separated producers of one nationality from 
consumers of another. Chalmers argued for Free Trade on moral grounds, arguing that such a 
policy would ensure the “peace and brotherhood of nations” (Chalmers, 1832, 449). 
 
This interpretation of Christianity was congruent with and closely related to the 
Cobdenite theory of international relations, a worldview that captured the loyalties of many 
businesspeople in Britain during Addis’s youth. The Cobdenites, who favoured Free Trade 
and the elimination of all government-imposed barriers to international trade, had a quasi-
utopian vision of a world in which national border, allegiances, and animosities had been 
transcended by a global commercial nexus linking businesses of all nationalities (Ceadel, 
2011). This ideology would shape Addis’s thinking up until his death in 1945 (Dayer, 1988, 
309-310). 
  At the age of eleven, Addis enrolled at the Edinburgh Academy, where he studied 
until 1876, when he was apprenticed to Peter Dowie and Company, a local grain importing 
firm. In 1880, Addis joined HSBC. As Cassis (1994, 110) notes, colonial banks such as 
HSBC “offered more promotion opportunities” for ambitious young men than purely 
domestic banks. Thereafter, he was posted to HSBC branches in Singapore, Hong Kong, 
China, India, and Burma, where he worked with businessmen of various nationalities, 
European, North American, and Asian, all of whom were motivated by the quest for profits. 
In 1905, Addis was transferred back to HSBC’s London Office, becoming its head in 1911, a 
post he held until 1921. Addis was knighted in 1913. The Britain to which Addis returned in 
1905 was far less committed to economic liberalism than it had been in 1880, when the mid-
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Victorian consensus in favour of international Free Trade and domestic laissez-faire was still 
largely intact. The subsequent move away from so-called economic ‘individualism’ alarmed 
British classical liberals (Taylor, 1992, 36; Perkin, 1977). By 1905, classical liberalism in 
domestic and foreign policy was under assault from both the economic-nationalist right and 
the socialist left (Cronin, 1991, 29-30, 37-8; Palen, 2010, Pugh, 2011,  71-77; Scally, 1975; 
Semmel, 1960).  Much of Addis’s post-1905 career was spent fighting a rear-guard action to 
defend the institutions of cosmopolitan capitalism against these forms of collectivism.  
In 1921, Addis retired from active management at HSBC, although he remained on its 
board and those of other important firms connected to the Far East and served on the council 
of the Weimar Republic’s central bank. His appointment to the German Council of the 
Reichsbank in the 1920s was, in part, a function of his willingness to remain on cordial 
relations with German bankers despite the recent war (Dayer, 1988, 146, 164). Addis 
observed in the Spectator magazine  (Addis,1938, 173) that while economic liberalism was 
now deeply unfashionable, he was still an “unpenitent” classical liberal in the tradition of 
Adam Smith. In the same essay, Addis predicted that there would eventually be a resurgence 
in economic liberalism and a “return to the old paths, ‘the obvious and simple system of 
natural liberty,’ the free and unfettered play of national economic activities, in which alone 
are to be found the permanent elements of international peace and security.” This prediction 
appears to have been prophetic given that cosmopolitan capitalism was recreated in the 
neoliberal era that followed the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989 (Fourcade-Gourinchas & 
Babb, 2002; Frieden, 2006). 
	
 Addis’s Defence of Cosmopolitan Capitalism 	
 
Addis’s support for the institutions of cosmopolitan capitalism was, in part, a function 
of his upbringing and religious and political views, but his ideas were also consistent with the 
material interests of his employer, a firm that exemplified many of the features of 
cosmopolitan capitalism. HSBC had been incorporated in the British Crown Colony of Hong 
Kong in 1865 and was thus an indisputably “British” firm in the eyes of contemporary British 
law (Newman, 1918), regardless of its multinational shareholder base. Nevertheless, 
individuals of a variety of nationalities, races, and faiths were involved in the bank as 
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shareholders and directors (King, 1988, 18-21, 192-3, 537-595). The bank’s first manager, 
who may have been French or German, was poached from the Comptoire d’Escompte, a 
“French” bank with an extensive presence in British India and other Asian markets (C. Jones, 
1987, 82). Despite the deterioration in relations between Germany and Britain after the 
Adagir Crisis of 1911 (Kennedy, 1980), HSBC’s four German directors did not resign from 
the bank’s board until war actually broke out on 4 August 1914 (South China Morning Post, 
12 August 1914). Over the course of the war, HSBC took steps to assert its British nationality 
and to ensure that the authorities in London came to regard it as an essentially “British”, 
rather than cosmopolitan firm. The bank ostentatiously contributed to the British war effort 
and its managers in Hong Kong subjected managers in its far-flung branch network to greater 
central control. One of the bank’s reasons for asserting control over distant branches was to 
ensure local staff did not continue to associate with “German” firms, as such association 
could have degraded the firm’s legitimacy in the eyes of the British government (Smith, 
2016). 
With the outbreak of the war in August 1914, the British government was confronted 
with the question of whether and to what degree it should permit commerce with Germany to 
continue. Policymakers had two contradictory precedents to follow. One model was 
suggested by the laws of the mercantilist period, when states had sought to ban virtually all 
commerce between  the subjects of enemy kings during wartime. The precedent-based nature 
of English-common law was one factor that encouraged policymakers to ban trade between 
“British” and “German” firms (Fridman, 1955). The other model was that of the Crimean 
War of the 1850s, when trading between British and Russian merchants had been permitted, 
notwithstanding the governments of the two countries were at war. The impeccably liberal 
logic underpinning the British government’s Crimean War trade policy was that it would be 
unfair to attack a merchant’s property just because he had the same nationality as the Tsar. 
Allowing British and Russian firms to trade as normally was in keeping with the principle of 
methodological individualism that was at the heart of the classical-liberal worldview (Searle, 
1998, 206-9; Levy and Barbieri, 2004). As war with Germany became a real possibility after 
1906, British policymakers had argued about the extent to which it would be morally 
permissible and politically prudent to attack the property and livelihoods of German private 
citizens in the course of a fight with the Kaiser’s armies (Offer, 1988).   
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During the early phases of the First World War, the British government’s approach to 
trading with the enemy blended these two approaches. Shortly after the declaration of the war, 
the British government banned trading with “enemy alien” citizens and firms anywhere in 
Europe. Criminal prosecutions of businessmen under the Trading With the Enemy Act soon 
followed (see United Kingdom Parliamentary Papers, 9 March 1915; Lobban, 2014). This 
law was a logical corollary of Admiral Fisher’s strategy of blockading Germany into 
submission. This strategy, which had been developed by the British Admiralty between 1906 
and 1911, had been opposed in pre-war discussions by (some) liberal-minded naval officers 
and politicians. Opponents of the blockade strategy associated it with a degree of interference 
in international trade that was incompatible with both international law and the distinction 
between the affairs of states and those of private firms. In implementing Fisher’s blockade 
strategy in 1914, the British government demonstrated that it was willing to abandon rules of 
warfare that had prevailed in the nineteenth-century heyday of liberalism  (Offer, 1988; 
Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, 2016, 34-36).  During the war, the distinction in Britain between the 
German state and German individuals and firms quickly broke down, much to the dismay of 
Addis. Over the course of the war, growing anti-German sentiment led to crowd action 
against enemy alien property. The depth of British popular hostility to the enemy nation can 
be judged from the fact British musicians debated whether it was still appropriate to play the 
works of Mozart, an Austrian composer (Watkins, 2002, 40). Public hostility towards all 
things “German” extended to companies connected to Germany: politicians and newspapers 
repeatedly attacked HSBC for its previous and ongoing dealings with Germans in parliament 
and in the press (Addis Diary, 22 July 1915; Addis Diary, 2 November 1916; Gwynne, 14 
November 1916; Prettyman, 14 November 1916).   
British policymakers knew that measures designed to punish “German” firms would 
be popular with the electorate, particularly those who had male relatives at the front. At the 
same time, however, the British government accommodated domestic interest groups by 
permitting limited trading with some German firms (Lambert, 2012, 256-8). Due to lobbying 
by banks with counterparty claims on German financial institutions, the British government 
permitted the London branches of several leading “German” banks to continue operating. 
These offices were staffed by enemy aliens who were controversially exempted from the 
internment policy applied to other German males (Leaf and Vassar Smith, 1916, 2; Panayi, 
1991,  132-5, 142-50).  
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The special rules most important to Addis related to business in Asia, specifically the 
use of “German” distributors to convey British textiles to consumers in China’s interior. Six 
months after the outbreak of the war, many of Britain’s textiles exports to China still passed 
through the hands of German-controlled wholesale companies in Chinese ports (Manchester 
Guardian, 15 March 1915).  In May 1915, the British government held a secret meeting of 
business leaders on the subject of whether such trade should continue. The government’s 
representatives began the meeting by explaining that they wished to ‘cut down on’ the 
volume of trade between “British” and “German” companies in China but in a fashion that 
would avoid job losses in Britain’s textile manufacturing towns.  It soon became evident to 
Addis and others in the room that the issue of whether to ban trading with the enemy in China 
had deeply divided the representatives of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce in 
attendance (Board of Trade, Transcript of Conference of 4 May 1915).  
Siding with the liberal faction in Manchester’s textile sector, Addis argued for the 
continued use of “German” distributors in China. In his view, any attempt to transfer the 
distribution work to British firms would constitute dangerous interference with market forces. 
Addis reasoned that the existing international division of labour, whereby the British 
manufactured the textiles and the Germans distributed them in China, as taking advantage of 
the comparative advantage of each nation. Addis praised the ‘efficiency’ of the German firms 
in China and said that if British merchants wished to obtain more distribution work, they 
ought to emulate the admirable methods and work ethic of the Germans rather than looking to 
the government for artificial assistance in the form of the proposed ban.  
 
The views Addis presented at the conference were entirely consistent with those he 
expressed in internal HSBC correspondence, where he wrote “I regard with equal disfavour 
the attempts of The China Association and others to induce the Government to boycott 
German firms in China. A British firm here and there might benefit, as you have clearly 
shown, at the expense of British trade in general” (Addis to Stabb, 12 March 1915).  While 
Addis’s major arguments in favour of continuing to trade with German firms in China were 
essentially economic, he also invoked a classical liberal system of moral economy that held 
that an individual’s nationality should be irrelevant in making economic policy. He stressed 
the sanctity of private property in “trademarks” and “goodwill” when he, declared, rather 
naively,  that no British official “would seriously contend that a state of war justifies stripping 
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even a German of his private property” (Addis, Memorandum on Conference with Runciman 
and Simon 4 May 1915).  
Despite Addis’s eloquent speech in a favour of the continuation of trade with 
Germans in China,  the  British government enacted a more stringent ban on trading with 
enemy alien firms and citizens in Asia. Thereafter, any British cotton mill or broker who 
continued to use the services of ‘German’” distributors faced the threat of criminal 
prosecution. For instance, in November 1915 two cotton dealers were convicted and fined 
£100 at a trial in Manchester for sending twenty cases of shirts to a ‘“German” firm in 
Shanghai (Manchester Guardian, 16 November 1915). The rules for HSBC and other British-
controlled firms incorporated in the Far East remained, however, more relaxed, as they were 
allowed to pay dividends to German shareholders resident in China (General Licences Under 
King’s Regulations, No 10 of 1915).  HSBC’s branches in Qingdao and Shanghai also 
worked with German customers to mutual commercial advantage, thereby flouting the spirit 
of the trading with the enemy law (Inspector’s Report on Tsingtao branch, 24 July 1915;  
Inspector’s Report on Shanghai, dated 22 October 1915,  28, 29).  
Throughout the war, Addis used public statements and private letters to challenge the 
increasingly widespread view that the disruption of German overseas trade would benefit 
rather than impoverish the British economy (Addis to Mills, 17 May 1919; Nicholson to 
Addis, 10 December 1916). This view had been championed by “Tariff Reformers” who had 
complained about German commercial competition before the war (Winch, 2014, 758). 
Sailing boldly against the current of public opinion in Britain, Addis firmly distinguished 
German government property from ‘“German” private firms and their assets, suggesting that 
while it was legitimate to try to destroy ‘German militarism,’ it would be immoral for the 
British state to ‘prey on private property’ (Paper enclosed with Addis to Mills, 9 January 
1915).   
 
 




After 1918, Addis participated in the public debate about the future of British banking 
institutions. Debating whether British banks were doing enough to help British industry was a 
perennial issue that had been debated before the war and which would lead to the 
establishment in 1929 of the investigatory Macmillan Committee (Scott and Newton, 2007). 
During the First World War, however, this issue became closely tied to the question of 
whether the lending decisions of British bankers were insufficiently patriotic. During the war, 
those who thought that “British” banks should be required to redirect their lending to “British” 
firms listed pre-war cases in which “British” banks had lent money to “German” exporters 
that were in direct competition to “British” manufactures (Firth, 1916, 8).  
Such demands for changes in British bank lending practices were made by such 
exporters as Wedgwood, the ceramics firm, Hornby, the toy company, and the British 
Electrical and Allied Manufacturers Association (Board of Trade Committee, 1916, 30). In 
the eyes of these critics, British banks were failing in their patriotic duty to channel British 
savings into firms that were unambiguously “British”. Speaking of this issue, one witness 
denounced the “cosmopolitan element with whom profit always come first” (Board of Trade 
Committee, 1916, 22). In a 1918 book that incidentally denounced the treasonous 
cosmopolitanism of the English bankers, Sir Oswald Stoll declared that “the four great 
German Banks keeps [the German] population in shackles more complete than was serfdom 
in England in the days of Feudalism” (Stoll, 1918, 145). 
  For their part, Addis and many other British bankers denied that they had a patriotic 
duty to channel capital to “British” rather than “foreign” firms: in their view, purely 
commercial considerations rather than firm nationality should dictate how a bank made loans.  
Addis presented a robust defence of commercial cosmopolitanism and laissez-faire in his 
1918 essay Problems of British Banking. Addis’s paper argued the government should refrain 
from imposing burdensome regulations on banks and praised particular features of the 
German banking system in a fashion that revealed that he had continued to follow 
developments in German banking since 1914.  
Addis said that German banks had a “more efficient administration” than British ones 
because German bank boards included technical experts who were capable of  evaluating 
loan issues. Referring to his observations of bank board meetings in pre-war Berlin, Addis 
favourably contrasted the quality of their debates with the discussions in British bank 
boardrooms. German board meetings about proposed loans were characterised by ‘animation’ 
14	
	
and the display of extensive “knowledge” by individual directors.  A bank board meeting in 
London, he said, involved the difficulty “of withdrawing its members even temporarily from 
their country pursuits” and “their obvious anxiety to lose no time in returning to them… only 
one or two here and there who had no train to catch are willing to discuss the matters in hand 
with attention” (Addis, 1918, 51).  Addis also touched on the issue of executive 
compensation, complained that English bank shareholders were reluctant to emulate their 
German counterparts by awarding directors higher fees. The main thrust of Addis’s pamphlet 
was to praise the German way of banking. 
In addition to lavishing praise on Germany’s institutions of bank governance and 
director compensation, Addis also commended the managers of the leading German banks for 
maintaining high capital ratios, a technical banking issue that had been discussed by the 
Colwyn Committee, which had been appointed in March 1918 to investigate bank 
amalgamation (Billings et al., 2019). The German banks’ adequate cushions of capital 
reduced the probability that they would have to rely on the government or some other lender 
of last resort. As a classical liberal, Addis thought banks should be self-reliant. In his eyes, 
the evident commitment of the German bankers to self-reliance made them exemplary role 
models to bankers in Britain.  Addis described how war had encouraged a wave of bank 
mergers in both Germany and England. The crucial difference between the two countries, he 
said, was that the newly merged banks in Germany “have increased their paid-up capital and 
reserves while the English banks have not” (Addis, 1918, 51). 
It is striking that in the last year of a particularly sanguineous war, Addis would invest 
time in writing an essay that praised the bankers of Germany. The publication of his essay 
involved some risk to his political capital, for it could easily have been interpreted as non-
patriotic, even treasonous.  Addis had earlier been called into the Foreign Office for 
“unpleasant” interviews in which HSBC had been accused of giving excessive assistance to 
enemy alien firms in China (Addis diary, 2 December 1915; 14 January 1916).  Given that 
other British businessmen had actually been sent to prison for trading with the Germans 
(Millar, 1915), his decision to praise Germany’s banking institutions was a risky political 
move. The impression one forms from reading Addis’s 1918 essay in light of the ongoing 
demonization of all things German in wartime Britain was that his commitment to liberal 
principles meant that he was sometimes politically tone-deaf.  
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Addis’s 1918 essay was unapologetic in its defence of cosmopolitan capitalism. 
Taking aim at the critics who wanted the state to force a  redirection of bank lending away 
from foreign trade finance and towards domestic manufacturing,  he said that the British 
tradition of “untrammelled competition” and “freedom”,   of laissez-faire and openness had 
made London the financial centre of the world and the home of large numbers of foreign 
banks and commercial agencies. Prior to the war, some Britons had objected to the diversion 
of credit from domestic lending to the financing of trade between pairs of foreign countries 
on the ground that this use of capital did not benefit Britain’s domestic economy. To such 
critics, Addis replied that government intervention in international trade finance would “place 
in jeopardy the financial supremacy of London as the clearing house of the world. A free 
market means that anyone can send bills here for discount and be sure of getting gold for it 
when he wants it.” He declared that “freedom is the breath of life for credit and commerce” 
and the “best service government can render the London money market is to leave its 
management and control to the bankers whose business it is to understand it.”  (Addis, 1918,  
56).  
In his discussion of the wartime mergers of banks in Britain and Germany, Addis 
acknowledged that while there was often a strong business case for amalgamating banks, the 
current wave of bank mergers in the two countries might eventually lead to increased state 
regulation of the financial sectors of the two countries, which would be bad for all concerned. 
He reasoned that the newly-merged banks would be too big to fail and would thus enjoy a 
“virtual” guarantee from the State. “From government guarantees to Government control is 
but a step and but a step more to nationalization.” Referring to a prominent socialist 
intellectual, Addis wrote that “we are playing into the hands of Mr. Sidney Webb and the 
socialists.” He reported to his British readers the alarming news that the new Prussian 
Minister of Finance ‘is said to be considering a state monopoly of banking’ in that country 
(Addis, 1918,  10). As a member of the international fraternity of professional bankers, Addis 
appears to have felt sympathy for the German bankers who were now confronted with what 
he clearly regarded as a dangerous socialist demagogue.   
 




Addis recognized that the future institutions of the global economy would be shaped 
by whatever peace treaty emerged at the end of the conflict.  From 1916 onwards, Britons 
debated whether punitive reparations payments should be imposed on Germany after its 
defeat (Bunselmeyer, 1975). In 1916, the economists John Maynard Keynes and William 
Ashley had authored a report urging Britain to not seek reparations and to instead focus on 
reviving Anglo-German trade as quickly as possible after the conclusion of the hostilities.  
These authors clearly favoured the restoration of the pre-1914 institutions of cosmopolitan 
capitalism, a point of view supported by Addis, who became an ally of Keynes. Reparations 
set at a level calculated to destroy the German economy were favoured by many protectionist 
manufacturing companies, especially those that had complained loudly about German 
competition before 1914 and who viewed Germany’s pre-war industrialization through the 
zero-sum worldview lens associated with the pre-war Tariff Reform movement (Thackeray et 
al., 2018). Business leaders who had feared German competition prior to the war joined 
ordinary citizens who had lost menfolk in demanding the peace settlement that Keynes would 
later famously denounce as the ‘Carthaginian Peace’ (Skidelsky, 1983,  386).  
Addis clashed with a fellow investment banker, Walter Cunliffe  (1855–1920), even 
though their backgrounds exhibited some similarities: both men had been born in the mid-
Victorian era and had spent their careers in banking. Both men worked for financial 
institutions that had had dealings with “German” firms before the war, although those of 
Addis’s HSBC were, admitted, much larger than the known German connections of Cunliffe 
Brothers. Both men were wealthy enough to maintain elegant country houses outside of 
London. Addis and Cunliffe came from what Cassis (1994, 93) calls Social Class I in his 
analysis of the social origins of Edwardian bankers. However, Addis and Cunliffe were very 
different in political views and, perhaps more fundamentally, in temperament. Addis was a 
cosmopolitan liberal who favoured giving Germany a soft peace while Cunliffe revealed 
himself to be an economic nationalist with a zero-sum understanding of the world economy 
that impelled him to call for the imposition of maximum reparations payments on Germany.  
The surviving primary sources strongly suggest that Addis was extremely curious, a trait that 
present-day psychological research associates with Openness to Experience and liberal-
internationalist political views (Graham et al., 2009, Iyer et al., 2012). The same research 
shows that individuals with a strong desire for order and regimentation in their lives generally 
adopt conservative and nationalist views.  
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We know that Addis was an omnivorous reader, attempted to learn Chinese and 
German, and frequently attended academic lectures in London (Dayer, 1988), all of which 
suggests that he would get high scores for Openness to Experience in a modern psychometric 
test of personality traits.  In contrast, Cunliffe was described by his contemporaries, and by 
his biographer (Burk, 2008) as uninterested in intellectual pursuits. He preferred hunting and 
fishing to books and conversation. Burk observes that nobody ever called Cunliffe “clever” 
and that “he frequently reacted by emotion and intuition.” Cunliffe clung to opinions with 
dogmatic certainty and a contemporary said that he “had the advantage of knowing his own 
mind, perhaps not a very difficult one to know.” During the First World War, “the autocratic 
and aggressive, even bullying, tendencies of Cunliffe’s character” increased (Burk, 2008). 
Seen in the light of the psychological research cited in the previous paragraph, the clashes 
between Addis and Cunliffe can be viewed as a contest between both two political ideologies 
and two personality types. 
In fighting Cunliffe and his supporters, Addis enjoyed the support of two important 
manufacturing entrepreneurs: Lord Leverhulme of Lever Brothers and Hugo Hirst of the 
England’s General Electric Company. Leverhulme’s worldwide network of soap companies 
included  a soap factory in Germany. In 1916, Leverhulme had avocated offering  Germany 
soft peace terms in the hopes of ending the war quickly and  then restoring the pre-war 
economic system (Knight to Lever, 15 May 1916).  Leverhulme, of course, had a vested 
interest in any political settlement that restored the ability of German households to spend on 
consumer products, so his adoption of liberal attitudes towards Germany can be viewed as a 
function of his firm’s business interests. 
 Addis also enjoyed the support of Hirst, a German-born British citizen who had 
established one of the UK’s most advanced electrical goods firms. Prior to the war, Hirst had 
complained that his company had suffered from unfair competition from German companies 
such as Siemens and AEG, which had acquired lucrative contracts in British colonies 
(Fitzgerald, 2016). During the conflict, Hirst’s firm  had profited from the exclusion of 
German competitors from world markets military contracts (Davenport-Hines, 2005; 
Fitzgerald, 2016). Given that Hirst’s material interests were congruent with those of the many 
protectionist manufacturers who now demanded the imposition of severe reparations on 
Germany, Hirst’s opposition to a collective punishment on Germany is perhaps best 
understood in relation to his German birth. 
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Addis had the opportunity to share his views about peace terms when he was called to 
testify before a government   committee to investigate the issue of a war indemnity to be 
levied on Germany (Skidelsky, 1983, 355–356). He testified that any indemnity imposed on 
Germany should be no more than £60 million per annum, a relatively low figure. Addis 
claimed that hostile members of the committee such as William Morris Hughes of Australia 
and Lord Cunliffe repeatedly ‘heckled’ him during his presentation. When he reported back 
to the Imperial War Cabinet, the committee’s chairman was dismissive of Addis’s opinions 
noting that he had ‘German interests and associations’ (IWC, 24 December 1918). Ignoring 
the advice of Addis and Hirst, the Hughes Committee decided that Germany should be 
required to pay the entire costs of the war, £24 billion. The annual interest and amortization 
costs on this debt load would amount to £1.2billion, a figure vastly greater than that 
suggested by Addis (Dayer, 1988, 103).  
The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, appointed Cunliffe, along with Lord Sumner, a 
judge, and Prime Minister Hughes of Australia, as the British members of the Reparations 
Commission of the Paris Peace conference. Cunliffe, who wanted to saddle Germany with the 
largest possible reparations payment, repeatedly fought John Maynard Keynes, a liberal-
minded civil servant who opposed the plans to cripple the German economy with onerous 
reparations, and Thomas W. Lamont, the J.P. Morgan partner who subsequently arranged a 
major loan to the Weimar Republic (Lamont, 1930; Trachtenberg, 1979, 33). Cunliffe was, 
however, supported by the French and by those in the British delegation who shared his goal 
of destroying Germany’s ability to compete in international markets. Since his goal was to 
arrive at the highest possible reparations bill, Cunliffe did not employ a rigorous 
methodology in determining the figure to be presented to the German delegation: Cunliffe 
admitted that he arrived at the astronomical figure of £40 billion on the basis of a guess about 
Germany’s ability to pay (Lentin, 1999, 61).   
When the Peace Conference was underway at Versailles, Addis and likeminded 
businessmen launched a campaign to persuade the British delegates to oppose the heavy 
indemnities advocated by the French government. As part of this campaign, Addis presented 
a paper to the Institute of Bankers (5 March 1919). In this paper, he held that the 
interdependence of nations ‘makes it impossible to cripple Germany without to some extent 
crippling British trade.’ The aim of policymakers, he implied, was to restore the pre-war 
international business institutions as quickly as possible. Addis also pointed out that any 
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German indemnity would be paid not to British individuals but to the British government, 
and that the State had a decidedly mixed track record in managing funds wisely. Here, Addis 
was arguing that Britain would be better off if the proposed indemnity payment was left in 
the pockets of consumers in Germany rather than being transferred to the public sector in the 
United Kingdom.  Addis’s belief in the superiority of the private sector was so strong that he 
preferred to leave resources in the private sector of an enemy nation rather than in the coffers 
of his own nation’s elected government. 
 
Conclusion and Implications for Future Research  
 
As we have seen, Addis continued to defend cosmopolitan capitalism throughout the 
First World War. He lobbied on behalf of firms to continue trading with firms controlled by 
enemy alien citizens. As the conflict came to a close, he advocated a political arrangement 
that would have given Germany a soft peace that would have allowed German firms to 
resume their pre-war role in the international division of labour. Addis bold stand on such  
policies in a social context marked by intense xenophobia involved considerable risks to his 
political and social capital. In our view, Addis’s willingness to speak up on behalf of 
cosmopolitan capitalism was a function of his temperament, his deep philosophical 
commitment to classical liberalism, and his view that the long-term interests of his firm 
would be best promoted by the preservation of cosmopolitan capitalism.  
As we observed in the introduction, the political trends associated with the post-2008 
backlash against globalization (Witt, 2019) has increased the “liability of foreignness” faced 
by many firms. The period since the U.S. presidential election of 2016 has witnessed the 
intensification of political tensions between capitalist Great Powers. Policymakers and other 
observers (Coker, 2014) have expressed concern that the United States and China are falling 
into the “Thucydides Trap”, a scenario in which there is  confrontation rather than 
cooperating between the rising power and the previously hegemonic power (Rosencrance and 
Miller, 2014; Allison, 2017; Yang, 2018). The term Thucydides Trap, which was used by 
Chinese President Xi Jinping in a speech to a concerned group of US and Chinese MNE 
executives in Seattle (Xi, 2015), is frequently employed to analogize the current Sino-
American relationship to the pre-1914 Anglo-German relationship.  Many find this analogy 
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persuasive because these countries were both geopolitical rivals and interdependent trading 
partners (Krause, 2014; Tooze, 2018).   
Whilst it is difficult to predict what the impact of a further escalation of Sino-
American tensions on MNEs would be, the historical record can provide some insight into 
how present-day business leaders would respond to the approach of an actual war between 
these two powers. The historical research presented here suggests that while some business 
leaders would work to preserve cosmopolitan capitalism, as Addis did, other business leaders 
would work to replace cosmopolitan capitalism with a system in which a firm’s nationality 
would become more central to firm strategy. These business leaders would likely behave in 
an opportunistic fashion, seeking to use the new political environment to their advantage.  
How any individual business leader would behave in these circumstances would, according to 
the working theory of human behaviour we have used to understand Addis, be influenced by 
some combination of material considerations, temperament, and deeply held political 
principles. We suspect that only a small minority of business leaders would have the courage 
to defend liberal values such as openness to international trade and interacting with each firm 
based on its individual characteristics rather than the firm’s presumed nationality.   
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